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We construct a two-region model of monopolistic competition with mobile entrepreneurs.
Typical implicit assumption on increasing returns to scale sector is that ﬁrms can produce
and sale only at one place. We explicitly introduce multi-plant case and examine location
equilibrium with decreasing transpiration costs. The diﬀerence between single-plant and
multi-plant ﬁrms lies in export-ﬁxed cost and set-up ﬁxed cost of multi-plant. We ﬁnd
that at certain transportation costs, ﬁrms change their organization type from multi-plant
to single-plant and, with further decrease in transportation costs, ﬁrms concentrate in one
region.
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11 Introduction
As is conﬁrmed by many studies, in regional trade and international trade, “geography
matters”. Krugman (1991) sheds lights on geography in international trade. Krugman and
Venables (1995), Puga and Venables (1999), Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), Ottaviano,
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), and Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) are also on the same direction
with analytical derivation on stability analysis. Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and
Robert-Nicoud (2003) is also contributed in this respect. There are the studies on the location
choice of ﬁrms and the stability of the location equilibria. Including these studies, most
of the previous studies in international trade based on diﬀerentiated goods assume that a
diﬀerentiated goods is produced by one ﬁrm and that the production is held at one place.
Keeping the above assumptions, even under heavy transportation costs, ﬁrms have to
choose one location to produce and deliver their products to the region and to the other region.
However, as is pointed out by Brainard (1997), ﬁrms faces proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ1
and ﬁrms change their plant conﬁguration, depending on the degree of trade barriers. When
we relax the single-plant assumption, we could easily imagine the location equilibrium with
multi-plants in each regions when trade barriers and (or) transportation costs are very high.
This conﬁguration to operate plants in multi-regions is described as horizontal FDI. As long
as we keep the single plant assumption, we could not analyze the ﬁrms’ choice and eﬀects
including horizontal FDI.
Instead of keeping this single-plant assumption, when we restrict ourselves on the alter-
native assumption that the production should be held at every place. The impact of transport
costs vanishes from the analysis. Then we could say that “geography doesn’t matter”. Both
assumptions are the extreme cases for the analysis on international trade. While there are sub-
stantial development in theory of international trade, the issues with multinational enterprises
are still left aside.
The aim of this paper is to propose some simple modiﬁcations, based on Forslid and
Ottaviano (2003) which enables closed form solutions for Fujita et al. (1999). Our simple
modiﬁcation enables us to analytically analyze the choice of ﬁrms conducting multinational
business, services and productions. We explicitly introduce the organization choice on the
conﬁguration of plants. As we relax the assumption on the number of plants, we show that
“not only geography but also organization matters”.
Markusen and Venables (1998) and Raybaudi-Massilia (2000) also analyze behavior of
multinational ﬁrms and the choice of horizontal FDI. However, Krugman and Venables (1995)
and Puga and Venables (1999) showed the stability the analysis with simulation results only.
1While proximity to market enables ﬁrms to earn larger proﬁt, ﬁrms can exploit scale economies to concen-
trate their production at one place. Toulemonde (2007) also gives a short reasoning on this trade oﬀ.
2The others derive analytical results. Ekholm and Forslid (2001), Toulemonde (2008), Toule-
monde (2007), and Behrens and Picard (2007) are some studies which share the same spirit
with ours. However Toulemonde (2008), Toulemonde (2007) and Behrens and Picard (2007)
also model this point in similar but diﬀerent strategy. They adopt Footloose Capital model
where location decision is made in terms of nominal proﬁt. The clear diﬀerence comes from
theirs and ours lies on the stability of symmetric ﬁrms’ distribution and the mixed patterns.
Instead of capital, we assume entrepreneurs who determine the location and organization of
ﬁrms in evaluating not nominal term but real term.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows; in section 2, a two-region model without
organization choice is constructed with symmetric regions as a benchmark. In section 3, or-
ganization choice is introduced. Possible caveats associated with the delimitation of studying
location choice are discussed in the ﬁnal section.
2 Location choice without organization choice
The economy is composed of symmetric two regions 1 and 2. There are two production
factors: entrepreneurs and immobile workers. In this economy, L unit of immobile workers
and H unit of entrepreneurs are endowed. While immobile workers are equally distributed
between regions and are immobile, entrepreneurs can choose the region to stay and the share
of entrepreneurs in region 1 is expressed by ¸.
2.1 Consumers
We assume that preference is identical across all workers in both regions and is expressed
by a combination of Cobb-Douglas and CES forms of utility function which is written as
U =
A1¡¹








where A stands for the consumption of agriculture good, q (i) is the consumption of man-





¾ di:N indicates the number of diﬀerentiated manufactured goods and ¾ > 1 is
the elasticity of substitution between any pair of manufactured goods. The share of expendi-
ture on manufactured goods is ¹ and the share of expenditure on agriculture good is 1¡¹. We
posit pA;p(i); and Pr as the price of agriculture good, the price of a diﬀerentiated manufac-






Then we could derive the demand function for a diﬀerentiated manufactured good and the
indirect utility function as,
















r Wr entrepreneur (4)
Wages for entrepreneurs and immobile worker are expressed by Wr;wr. Lower subscript
exhibits the location, r 2 [1;2]. Then using the share of entrepreneurs in region r; ¸; we may




wr + WrH¸ (5)
While the distribution of entrepreneurs is endogenous, for the analysis of symmetric re-
gions, we set the distribution of immobile workers as half and half.
2.2 Agriculture
Agriculture sector produces a homogeneous good under perfect competition and constant
returns to scale with using only labour input. This good is traded costlessly. Thus we take
agriculture as num´ eraire and normalize the wage, namely workers’ wage in region 1 into one,
pA = wA = wB = 1.
2.3 Single-plant ﬁrm (exporter)
In manufacturing sector, we assume that ﬁrms are imperfectly competitive ` a la Dixit-
Stiglitz and produce diﬀerentiated goods. Production of a diﬀerentiated good incurs one
unit of entrepreneurs as ﬁxed costs and one unit of immobile workers as marginal labour
requirement. Interregional trade of manufactured goods is marked by “iceberg” transport
costs and selling one unit in the other region requires t ¸ 1 units to be shipped. For later
reference, we posit Á = t1¡¾ as alternative measure of transport costs. We may call Á as trade
freeness. When transport costs are high, Á takes the value close to zero. Then increasing Á
expresses the decreasing transport costs and no transport costs can be expressed by Á = 1.
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When single-plant ﬁrms export their products to the other region where they do not locate,





























4where N expresses the total number of ﬁrms, N = H
(1+¿)f. As is mentioned in the in-
troduction, all imperfectly competitive ﬁrms without organization choice are assumed to be
exporters with single-plant. We assume speciﬁc ﬁxed-export costs. When a single-plant ﬁrm
locates in one region and establishes only one plant there, entrepreneurs have to set up an
exporting facility. This establishment cost for exporting is costly and is to be written as
¿rs = ¿ > 0;r 6= s. This speciﬁcation of additional ﬁxed cost could clarify the role of cost
diﬀerence between single and multi-plant ﬁrms. The proﬁt function of a diﬀerentiated good
ﬁrm with single-plant in one region r can be written as
¼S
r (i) = (pr (i) ¡ wr)qr (i) ¡ (1 + ¿)WS
r (i) (9)
The single-plant ﬁrm producing variety i chooses its mill price to maximize proﬁt ¼r (i).





Using the optimal prices both in proﬁt function and in price index, and normalizing labour












¡ (1 + ¿)WS
r (i) (11)
where ∆ is the bracket of the price index, (7), in region 1, ∆¤ is the equivalent of region 2.
We use ¸ as the share of ﬁrms in region 1. With normalizing the population of entrepreneurs
into one, we have the total number of ﬁrms as, N = 1=(1 + ¿). Then the share of entrepreneurs
in a region is the same with the share of ﬁrms in a region. Imposing the free entry condition
on this monopolistic sector with the equation in (11) and substituting the total number of














where ∆ = [¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)Á]; and ∆¤ = [¸Á + (1 ¡ ¸)] (13)
Using (5) and (12), we could perform the analysis on location equilibria.
2.4 Location equilibrium
It is one of the main concerns that how distribution of entrepreneurs evolves as transport
costs are steadily decreasing. Migration dynamics is characterized by the relative real wage of
entrepreneurs. It is straight forward to obtain the real wage diﬀerential. Using the wage equa-
tions in Appendix I and the labour market clear condition on entrepreneurs, N = H=(1 + ¿)
















(1 ¡ ¸)(¹ + ¾)Á2 + 2¾¸Á + (1 ¡ ¸)(¾ ¡ ¹)
¸(¹ + ¾)Á2 + 2¾ (1 ¡ ¸)Á + ¸(¾ ¡ ¹)
µ
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)Á




When this relative real wage is above (below) one, region 1 (2) is preferred by en-
trepreneurs. In order to examine the stability of the distribution of entrepreneurs, diﬀer-
entiating this equation (14) minus one respect to ¸ and evaluating at symmetric equilibrium
(¸ = 1=2); we obtain the break point:
ÁB =
(¾ ¡ ¹)(¾ ¡ ¹ ¡ 1)
(¾ + ¹)(¾ + ¹ ¡ 1)
(15)
When trade openness between regions are higher than ÁB, the symmetric equilibrium is
unstable. To avoid the case that even under inﬁnite transport costs agglomeration equilibrium
dominates to symmetrically dispersed equilibrium, it is assumed to hold the “no-black-hole”
condition2, ¹ < ¾ ¡ 1. The bifurcation diagram on distribution of ﬁrms and transportation
costs is described in Figure 2. While we put the ﬁxed export costs, since it cancels out with
the total number of ﬁrms, the result is exactly the same with Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
Using these wage equations, we obtain equation (14):
3 Location and organization choice
In this section, we study the location and organization choice of ﬁrms. We only
modify the assumption on the number of plants. Introduction of multi-plant ﬁrms means an
additional choice for entrepreneurs. We explicitly put the share of entrepreneurs in region 1
and 2 as ¸ and Λ. Furthermore, the share of entrepreneurs in multi-plant ﬁrms, single-plant
ﬁrms in each region as, mr; (1 ¡ mr). Since the sum of shares must be one, the share of
entrepreneurs in region 2 is expressed as Λ ´ 1¡¸. For expositional simpliﬁcation, we utilize
Λ except when we evaluate the share of ﬁrms explicitly. Nominal rewards to entrepreneurs in
multi-plant ﬁrms are assumed to be the same across regions. Following these speciﬁcations,

















While single-plant ﬁrms export the other region where they do not locate, multi-plant
ﬁrms can serve both regions without incurring transport costs. Thus the price index of the
2See Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), for the condition of original core-periphery model.





















First term expresses the price index of ﬁrms locating in region 1 and the second term
expresses the price index of ﬁrms locating in region B. The last expression is the price index
of multi-plant ﬁrms. Without the loss of generality, we normalize the population of mobile
entrepreneurs and immobile workers as one by each, L = H = 1.
3.1 Multi-plant producer (horizontal FDI)
Multi-plant ﬁrms are also depicted by imperfectly competitive ﬁrms ` a la Dixit-Stiglitz and
produce a diﬀerentiated good. The only modiﬁcation from the single-plant exporter is that
establishment of multi-plant incurs additional ﬁxed cost, ® > 0. This ﬁxed costs, ®, include
the costs for construction of the networks, as well as the costs for establishing a subsidiary
in the other region and the duplicate overhead production costs3. For the production, multi-
plant ﬁrms employ immobile workers in both regions for variable input. Contrast to the cost
function of single-plant ﬁrms, since multi-plant ﬁrms locate in each region, the shipment of
products by multi-plant ﬁrms doesn’t incur transport costs, ¿rr = 0; r = 1 and 2, nor export
ﬁxed cost, ¿ = 0. Thus they face the demand from each regions without transport costs.
Taking each regional demand as given in (2), multi-plant ﬁrms maximize their proﬁt. Then

















r (i) = q M
rr (i) + q M
ss (i)
¼M (i) = (pr (i) ¡ wr)q M
rr (i) ¡ (ps (i) ¡ ws)q M
ss (i) ¡ (1 + ®)WM (i) (21)
where upper subscript M indicate multi-plant ﬁrms and WM is a entrepreneurs’ reward in
multi-plant ﬁrms in region r. Since location is indiﬀerent for multi-plant ﬁrms, their proﬁt
function and their wage for entrepreneur do not include region speciﬁc subscript. A multi-
plant ﬁrm producing variety i chooses its mill price to maximize proﬁt ¼M
r (i) respect to each
3Fujita and Gokan (2005) assume that the ﬁxed cost of a multi-plant ﬁrm to build an additional plant is
larger than the ﬁxed costs of the single plant. Toulemonde (2008) explain that several factors aﬀect the ﬁxed
costs of a multinational.
7region using discriminatory price. The price resulting from the maximization is a markup




wr; r = 1;2 (22)
Using the optimal prices both in proﬁt function and in price index, normalization of labour
wage in competitive sector as one, wr = ws = 1, and a given distribution of ﬁrms, the











¡ (1 + ®)WM (i) (23)
where 4 = [¸(1 ¡ m1) + Λ(1 ¡ m2)Á + (¸m1 + Λm2)];
and N = [¸(1 ¡ m1)Á + Λ(1 ¡ m2) + (¸m1 + Λm2)]
where 4 and N expresses the brackets of price indices, (18), in region 1 and 2 that are
now transformed into the ones which reﬂect the presence of multi-plant ﬁrms. Assuming the
existence of potential entrants ensures that the operating proﬁt of suppliers is set to zero, the
wage of entrepreneurs are obtained from the zero proﬁt condition of (23). Single-plant ﬁrms’
oﬀer to entrepreneurs are obtained from the same procedure as in (11) except that the price
index is not the same. Then, we obtain the Entrepreneurs’ reward for single-plant ﬁrm i and

























Since entrepreneurs could seek for the highest reward region and ﬁrms, if the oﬀered wage
is less than the others’, the ﬁrm cannot enter or remain the market because of the lack of
ﬁxed requirement. This could be interpreted as a bidding process of Entrepreneurs’ reward.
In equilibrium, ﬁrms oﬀer the same wage in the same region. Under the monotonic case of
single-plant ﬁrms, equilibrium wage condition is WS
r (i) = WS
r (j) = WS
r ; i 6= j and under the
monotonic case of multi-plant ﬁrms, equilibrium wage condition is WM (i) = WM (j) = WM;
i 6= j. On the other hand, under the mixed case of both ﬁrms, equilibrium wage must
hold WS
r (i) = WM
r (j); i 6= j: When there exists only one pattern, not mixed patterns,
this equilibrium equality condition on wage is applied to (24) for any single ﬁrms under
the monotonic single ﬁrms case, and it is applied to (25) for any multi-plant ﬁrms under
the monotonic multi-plant ﬁrms case. In each cases, the labour market clear condition of
entrepreneurs implies the total number of ﬁrms as N = 1=(1 + ¿) for only single plant case
4Note that suppose there is a wage gap between two regions, the prices chosen by multi-plant ﬁrm are
diﬀerent across regions.
8and N = 1=(1 + ®). On the other hand, when there exists mixed case, the total number
of ﬁrms is N = 1
((1+¿)(¸(1¡m1)+Λ(1¡m2))+(1+®)(¸m1+Λm2)). When all structures of two regions
are symmetric, including the share of multi-plant ﬁrms in the region, the total number of
ﬁrms can be written as, N = 1
(1+¿)(1¡m)+(1+®)m.Note that when we restrict ourselves with
the assumption that there is no organization choice and all ﬁrms be multi-plant ﬁrms, there
is no eﬀect from transportation costs. Thus agglomeration economies do not emerge and this
is illustrated in Figure 3.
3.2 Location equilibrium
While location choice is based on the real wage diﬀerential, organization choice is based on
the nominal wage. It is because the choice of multi-plant ﬁrms from single-plant ﬁrms doesn’t
require location change. Before examining the stability of symmetric structure, we observe
how the share of multi-plant ﬁrms aﬀect the relative real wage at symmetric structure. In
the case without organization choice, no multi-plant case, nominal wage diﬀerential, wS
1=wS
2,
is always one. On the other hand, in the case with organization choice, the relative real wage
become a function of multi-plant ﬁrms’ share in each region. When entrepreneurs face the
organization choice, their decision is based on the nominal wage diﬀerential. It is because
they can change the ﬁrm’s organization without changing the location. Firstly we solve the
equations for regional incomes and wages for entrepreneurs. Then we examine the stability of
symmetrically dispersed location equilibrium and of the organization of ﬁrms. Furthermore,
we see the stability of core-periphery structure location equilibrium and of the organization.
These location equilibria are endogenously determined as market outcomes.









Γ(1 ¡ Á)(1 + Á)(1 ¡ m2)Λ + (1 ¡ Á)(Λm2 ¡ ¸m1) ¡ ·(N + Á4)





Γ(1 ¡ Á)(1 + Á)(1 ¡ m1)¸ + (1 ¡ Á)(¸m1 ¡ Λm2) ¡ ·(4 + ÁN)







Γ(1 ¡ Á)(1 + Á)(1 ¡ m2)Λ + (1 ¡ Á)(Λm2 ¡ ¸m1) ¡ ·(N + Á4)
Γ(1 ¡ Á)(1 + Á)(1 ¡ m1)¸ + (1 ¡ Á)(¸m1 ¡ Λm2) ¡ ·(4 + ÁN)
(28)
where Γ ´ (1 + ®)=(1 + ¿); we could interpret this as the diﬀerential between ﬁxed
costs for newly establishment of plants and that for exporting and call it the diﬀerential of
transaction costs. When we assume 0 · ¿ < ® · 1, we have Γ 2 (1;2]. In the beginning
when transport costs are very high, all ﬁrms are multi-plant, m1 = m2 = 1. Substituting this
distribution condition of multi-plant ﬁrms into above, we obtain the nominal wage diﬀerential











Γ(1 + Á) (29)
Note that we obtain identical result with the case that we just pose the condition of
symmetry in the share of multi-plant ﬁrms, m1 = m2 = m. It is obvious that this is an
increasing function of Á and when (29) is equal to one, ﬁrms change their organization from
multi-plant into single-exporting. The critical value of transport costs for organization change
is not a function of the share of multi-plant ﬁrms. Thus under symmetric distribution, we
cannot observe the mixed pattern of organization. Solving (29) equal to one for Á; we obtain












As long as all ﬁrms are multi-plant ﬁrms Á < ÁMS, both the nominal wage for en-
trepreneurs and price index in each region are unchanged. Since the measure of transport costs
is between 0 and 1, Á 2 [0;1], we need to clarify the condition of organization change. There
are three cases depending on the transaction costs diﬀerential in Γ. When 0 · ¿ < ® · 1;
that is Γ¡1 2 [1=2;1); (30) has always one interior solution in the range of ÁMS 2 [0;1).
This is the most various case in location equilibria, which we adopt the assumption of the
diﬀerential of transaction costs and we discuss later. When ¿ = ®; then we have Γ = 1. Thus
ÁMS = 1. Although multi-plant is always the stable organization of ﬁrms, only when there
is no transportation costs, it is indiﬀerent for all ﬁrms to change their organization. When
0 · ® < ¿ · 1; that is Γ¡1 2 (1;2]; then we have always Γ > 1. Thus ÁMS > 1 always holds.
This means that when export ﬁxed cost is larger than the establishment cost for multi-plant,
multi-plant is always the stable organization of ﬁrms and there is no organization change.
This is the case described in Figure 3. Then we could summarize some reasoning as follows.
Lemma 1 Organization change surely occurs once at certain transport costs, Á = ÁMS, as
long as 0 · ¿ < ® · 1 holds.
Lemma 2 The smaller (larger) the diﬀerence between the two transaction costs, the more
multi-plant is organizationally stable (unstable) under low transport costs.
For the closer observation, we examine the stability of this organization change when all
are multi-plant ﬁrms. Suppose the transportation costs decrease more than the critical value
of organization change, ÁMS < Á, at least, some ﬁrms change their organization. This change,
decrease in the share of multi-plant ﬁrms (m1 or m2), aﬀects the incentive of other ﬁrms in
both regions. In order to ﬁnd this eﬀect, we make the diﬀerentiation of the nominal wage
10diﬀerential, (26) to (28), with respect to m1 and m2. The results are listed in the Appendix

































From the expression in (31), while the organization change by some ﬁrms in region r
induces the other ﬁrms in the same region, not to change their organization, it urges the ﬁrms
in region s, to change their organization. Then this organization change in region s aﬀects
the ﬁrms in region r; vice versa. As is expressed in (32), the magnitude of these mutual
interactions is just equal. Thus these eﬀects are totally canceled out and have no eﬀect on
ÁMS. It means that all ﬁrms change their organization at the same time when they face the
critical transport costs, Á = ÁMS. These are summarized by the next equation and following
lemma and proposition.
Lemma 3 Under symmetric distribution of ﬁrms, when the share of multi-plant ﬁrms in each
region is the same, the organization change occurs instantaneously.
Then we could conﬁrm the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider monopolistic ﬁrms that have two choices in their production loca-
tion, single-plant exporting or multi-plant, under symmetric distribution of ﬁrms and
with decreasing transport costs.
(i) If ﬁxed cost for exporting is larger than that for multi-plant, (0 · ® < ¿ · 1), all ﬁrms
choose multi-plant and never change their organization even for lower transport costs.
(ii) If ﬁxed cost for exporting is the same as that for multi-plant, (¿ = ®), all ﬁrms choose
multi-plant and only when transportation costs vanishes, it is indiﬀerent for all ﬁrms to
change their organization, Á = ÁMS = 1.
(iii) If ﬁxed cost for exporting is smaller than that for multi-plant, (0 · ¿ < ® · 1), all ﬁrms
choose multi-plant under high transport costs and, at certain transport costs, they change
their organization from multi-plant to exporting.
Moreover, when ÁB < ÁMS holds, symmetric equilibrium is stable even under ÁB · Á ·
ÁMS, where the symmetric location equilibrium is unstable under the single-plant assumption.
This proposition implies one interesting scenario as described in Figure 4. Starting from
the symmetrically dispersed equilibrium, all ﬁrms change their organization from multi-plant
to single-plant at once and the economy is identical to the case we observed in the previous
11section. Thus the economy experiences the catastrophic change of regional structure and
exhibits agglomeration economies.
When the economy changes their distribution from symmetrically dispersed equilibrium
to core-periphery equilibrium, ﬁrms may face organization choice again. We turn to envisage
the case of core-periphery structure and organization choice. Since the organization choice is
determined within one region, the choice solely depends on the nominal wage diﬀerential in
the region. Evaluating the distribution as ¸ = 1; we obtain following equation.
Our results can be summarized in Figure 4 and 5. The case of Figure 4 occurs when Γ
is larger or, in other words, ÁMS < ÁB. This is the case that transaction costs diﬀerence
between ® and ¿ is small. On the other hand, when this transaction costs diﬀerence is larger,
Γ is smaller. Then it is the case above mentioned, ÁB < ÁMS. Then symmetrically dispersed
equilibrium is stable even under lower transport costs, ÁB · Á · ÁMS. This case is described
in Figure 5.
4 Conclusion
The assumption on the solitariness of ﬁrms’ organization has an essential lack of under-
standing on activities of multi-national ﬁrms. The globalization and the development of new
technologies can be characterized by lower transport costs of products and lower transaction
costs in exporting as well as horizontal FDI. Besides the analysis on agglomeration economies
of ﬁrms and workers, we explicitly introduce the organization choice to examine these two
eﬀects on choice of ﬁrms. We show that the decrease in transport costs induces ﬁrms agglom-
erate in one region, and also promotes ﬁrms to agglomerate their production in a single-plant
ﬁrm. Furthermore, decrease in additional ﬁxed costs would facilitate the development of
multi-plant ﬁrms. The impact of globalization seems to be unambiguous and relatively relies
on the diﬀerential of cost function between single- and multi- ﬁrm.
From our analysis, some results are emphasized. First, under symmetric regions, ﬁrms
change their organization at one time. Thus mixed organization of multi- and single- plant
ﬁrms never occurs. Secondly, the diﬀerence between the establishment ﬁxed costs and the
export ﬁxed costs determine the stability of multi-plant organization, horizontal FDI. When
establishment costs becomes lower, more ﬁrms choose multi-plant. On the other hand, when
ﬁxed export costs decrease, more ﬁrms choose single-exporting. We could conﬁrm that trans-
action costs unambiguously aﬀects not only the location choice of ﬁrms but also aﬀects their
organization choice. There would be other formulation on the diﬀerential of transaction costs.
In particular, in our model, the role of establishment costs is paied in terms of entrepreneurs
who have no nationality but residency. In the process of horizontal FDI and newly establish-
ments of plants, some managers are sent to the other region and work for more than a few
12years. Some ﬁrms pursue diversity in ethnicity in their recruitment and some ﬁrms locate in
home country. These phenomena are very popular in bussiness. However still minor in theory.
This is a modest attempt to capture the creative activities of multinational entrepreneurs.
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Appendix II
We set the share of single-plant ﬁrms and that of multi-plant ﬁrms as (1 ¡ mr) and mr;




(1+¿). Note that, for simpler notation, we set the share of

























2 + ¸(1 ¡ m1)WS
1 + ¸m1WM
14Y2 = L
2 + Λ(1 ¡ m2)WS
2 + Λm2WM
where 4 = ¸(1 ¡ m1) + Λ(1 ¡ m2)Á + ¸m1 + Λm2;
N = ¸(1 ¡ m1)Á + Λ(1 ¡ m2) + ¸m1 + Λm2
Since there are ﬁve unknown variables with ﬁve equations, we obtain a unique solution.















Using these results, we obtain (26) to (28). Furthermore, after substituting ·, with the
total number of ﬁrms, N, into the nominal wage diﬀerentials in the text, diﬀerentiating them
with respect to the share of multi-plant ﬁrms in each region, m1 and m2, and evaluating
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Figure 2  Distribution of firms without organization choice: single-plant exporting firms
















Figure 4  Distribution of firms with organization choice, nominal wage differential
and  the  share of multi plant firms, the difference in trade costs is large























Figure 5  Distribution of firms with organization choice, nominal wage differential
and  the  share of multi plant firms, when the difference in trade costs is small
A**=0.8,  τ=0.22, α=0.525
(a)
(b)
(c)